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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LE ROY SWEAT and VIRGINIA 
M. SWEAT, ADMINISTRATRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF BLAINE 
ORVEL SWEAT, DECEASED, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
REX T. FUHRIMAN, CRAIG 
FUHRIMAN, JAMES H. MAD-
DOX and DAN ALLISON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11,596 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JAMES H. MADDOX AND DAN ALLISON 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for wrongful death. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted summary judgment in 
favor of all defendants, no cause of action, and de-
nied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment a-
gainst defendants, Rex T. Fuhriman, Craig Fuhri-
man and Dan Allison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These defendants seek affirmance of the judg-
ment of the lower court in their favor. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 19, 1968, at approximately 2 :00 a.m. 
22 miles east of Heber on Highway 40 in Wasatch 
County, Blaine Orvel Sweat was struck by a west-
bound DeSoto automobile driven by Harold J. Ser-
gent and killed ( R. 124, attached accident reports). 
Plaintiffs are the father, mother and admini-
stratrix of the estate of Blaine Orvel Sweat, deceas-
ed ( R. 136, page 5). Plaintiffs were not witnesses 
to the accident (R. 136, page 10). 
Defendant Rex. T. Fuhriman, the father of 
Craig Fuhriman, is the owner of the Chevrolet Im-
pala automobile used by his son, Craig, at the time 
of the accident (R. 109, page 5). Rex T. Fuhriman 
did not witness the accident. Defendant James H. 
Maddox is the owner of a 1966 jeep. This jeep was 
loaned by him the day before the accident to his 
brother-in-law, Rickie Allison. Defendant James H. 
Maddox was in Price, Utah, at the time of the acci-
dent and did not witness it (R. 59). 
Dan Allison, the other defendant, did not see 
the accident either. He is the father of Rickie Alli-
son, deceased. 
Where the accident happened, Highway 40, 
was generally straight and level in each direction 
( R. 124, page 25). The roadway was marked for 
one lane in each direction ( R. 124, attached dia-
grams to depositions). 
Defendant, James H. Maddox, used the Dan 
2 
Allison family automobile to go on the trip to Price. 
He loaned his jeep, a 1966 model, to his brother-in-
law, Rickie Allison to use. Maddox granted Rickie 
permission to use the jeep to go from Rickie's home 
to Christensen Brothers farm. Rickie had a milking 
job each morning and evening and needed transpor-
tation to and from work ( R. 53). 
In spite of specific instructions from James 
Maddox to Rickie Allison not to use the jeep for any 
purpose except to go to and from milking at Chris-
tensen Brothers, the employer of Rickie Allison, 
Rickie took the jeep on Saturday night and used it 
to go to the Yearbook Dance at Wasatch High 
School. After 5 :00 p.m. on May 18, 1968, Blaine 
Sweat, the deceased, used and rode in the jeep with 
Rickie Allison. After the dance, Blaine Sweat and 
Rickie Allison met Craig Fuhriman and his friend, 
Henry Lund, who were returning to Salt Lake City 
from a fishing trip at Flaming Gorge at a service 
station near the Y in Heber ( R. 136, page 14). 
Fuhriman and Lund, who were driving an Im-
pala automobile westward on Highway 40, had run 
out of gas 22 miles east of Heber. Prior to running 
out of gas, they parked their automobile off the 
roadway facing left and left it without lights show-
ing. They hitchhiked into Heber to obtain a container 
of gasoline (R.136, pages 13, 14). 
Fuhriman and Lund were not able to get a 
container for gasoline at the Y Conoco service sta-
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tion in Heber, but aranged with Rickie Allison and 
Blaine Sweat to get a ride back to their stalled auto-
mobile ( R. 136, page 15). They left the service 
station in Heber at about 1 :30 a.m. and drove in a 
topless jeep. There was no conversation between 
Allison and Sweat, sitting in the front, and Fuhri-
man and Lund sitting in the rear of the open jeep. 
It was too cold and noisy to talk ( R. 136, page 18). 
They drove to the Strawberry station, woke up 
the operator and asked for gas and a container ( R. 
136, page 16). This station is located about a mile 
or mile and one-half east of where the Impala was 
stalled (R. 136, page 16). The operator of this ser-
vice station told the boys he had no container and 
thereafter Fuhriman purchased $2 worth of gaso-
line and had it put in the tanks of the jeep (R. 136, 
pages 16, 17). The boys intended to siphon gas from 
one vehicle to the other ( R. 136, page 1 7) . 
After getting the $2 worth of gas, Allison drove 
the jeep back to the Chevrolet Impala (R. 136, page 
18) . Rickie Allison drove back west past the stalled 
Impala, parked along the north edge of the roadway 
tur,ned around and then parked the jeep facing east 
along the north edge of the roadway in the west-
bound lane ( R. 136, pages 19, 20). He left the lights 
of the jeep on and activated the flasher lights (R. 
136, pages 22, 23). The jeep was parked so that the 
cap to its gas tank matched the cap of the stalled 
Impala with a space of about 3 feet in between. 
No one went to the east or west to flag or warn 
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traffic. The jeep blocked the westbound roadway 
and its lights shined down the straight road to the 
east ( R. 136, page 26). 
Rickie Allison took the siphon hose and en-
deavored to start to siphon gasoline from one tank 
to the other (R. 136, page 24). Almost immediately 
he got a mouth full of gasoline and had to quit. He 
moved to the rear of the stalled Impala operated by 
Fuhriman and was spitting out gasoline (R. 136, 
page 25). Blaine Sweat, without instructions from 
anyone, picked up the siphon hose and endeavored 
to start to siphon. While this was taking place, Craig 
Fuhriman and Henry Lund were standing along the 
edge of the jeep west of Sweat a few feet (R. 136, 
page 26). While Blaine Sweat was siphoning, Craig 
Fuhriman looked to the east and saw a vehicle ap-
proaching at a speed judged to be about 60 miles an 
hour about a block away (R. 136, page 62). He 
watched this vehicle for half a block and realized it 
was not going to stop and shouted a warning to the 
others and started to run ( R. 136, page 62). Blaine 
Sweat was siphoning gas when the warning was 
shouted (R. 136, page 61). Fuhriman does not know 
exactly where Lund and Allison were when he start-
ed to run ( R. 136, page 63). Craig Fuhriman took 
three or four steps west and then was struck and 
knocked down (R. 136, page 64). After this impact, 
he picked himself up and observed that the jeep was 
still standing on the roadway facing east with its 
lights on. He also observed that a car had struck 
5 
the rear of the unlighted Impala and pushed it off 
the roadway across the north barrow pit. After the 
impact Rickie Allison and Blaine Sweat were lying 
unconcious in the barrow pit northwest of where last 
seen (R. 136, page 66). Officer Gile's testimony 
shows that Rickie Allison was standing to the rear 
of the Impala when it was struck by a westbound 
DeSoto driven by Harold J. Sergent. Sergent, who 
was driving west, went off the road on his right 
to avoid the jeep and struck the rear of the Impala 
after hitting Rickie Lee Allison (R. 124, attached 
accident report). 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES NOT SUPPORT 
AN APPEAL AGAINST MADDOX. 
Appellants in their brief state no ground or 
point supporting a reversal of the judgment in favor 
of James Maddox. The general rule is that when the 
appellant fails to set forth .a specification of error 
as against a party in a brief, a higher court may 
affirm the judgment without reference to the merits 
of the case. 
In Roth vs. Palutzke, (1960) 350 P.2d 358, the 
plaintiff failed to set forth .any specifications of er-
ror in his brief as required by the Supreme Court 
rule of the State of Montana. 
Deemer vs. Reichart, (1965) 195 Kan. 232, 404 
P.2d 174, holds the reviewing court was required to 
take as established fact that party was negligent in 
parking a truck on highway where appellant failed 
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to raise the issue in Statement of Points on Appeal 
as to existence of negligence. 
In Lepasiotes vs. Dinsdale, (1952) 121 Utah 
359, 242 P.2d 297, this court affirmed a judgment 
where the appellants failed to specifically assign 
error. This court said: 
"As to any prejudicial error claimed, 
none of the many rulings on admission of evi-
dence was assigned specifically on appeal as 
constituting prejudicial error, so that any de-
cision thereon would require discussion of all 
objections, - no one of which plaintiff has 
had an opportunity to meet in her brief be-
cause of such nondesignation. Therefore, we 
feel constrained not to review those matters 
which plaintiff cannot def end against because 
not called to attention by her opponents." 
In In Re Lavelle's Estate, this court said, inso-
far as it is practical, an appellant who challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court's 
finding of undue influence must detail, with citation 
to the record where appropriate, the particulars 
where in the evidence touching the finding is incon-
sistent therewith or is not enough moment to sustain 
it. 
The purpose of a brief is to pinpoint how it is 
alleged the lower court erred. Since appellant's brief 
sets out no points or grounds as to alleged error in 
granting the judgment in favor of Maddox and a-
gainst appellants, it is presumed the lower court did 
not err. 
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Unless this court is clairvoyant, it like Maddox 
and his attorneys is prejudiced by appellants' failure 
to assign specific error. 
Matters not called to the attention of a party 
should not be raised on appeal. 
POINT II 
IF RI CK IE ALLISON WAS NEGLIGENT, 
BLAINE ORVEL SWEAT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
When Blaine Orvel Sweat was struck by Ser-
gent's automobile, he was engaged in siphoning gas 
from the tank of the jeep to the tank of the Impala. 
No one directed him to do this. Blaine Sweat was a 
volunteer. All of the boys, including Blaine Orvel 
Sweat, knew the jeep was parked on the roadway 
with its lights shining east in the westbound lane of 
the roadway. The boys knew the jeep was parked 
on the wrong side of the road. None of the boys 
agreed to act as a lookout for the person siphoning 
gas. No one was keeping a lookout for oncoming 
traffic. No one put warning signs or signals up 
ahead. No one asked Blaine Orvel Sweat to do what 
he was doing at the time he was struck. 
If it was negligence for Rickie Allison to park 
the jeep as he did, it follows since these facts were 
known by Sweat it was contributory negligence for 
Sweat to do what he was doing under the circum-
stances. Sweat is identified with whatever negli-
gence occurred at the time and place of the accident. 
Sweat, as an occupant of the jeep, sitting in the 
front seat when it was stopped, knew exactly the 
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manner in which it was placed in the roadway. The 
stopping of the jeep, the leaving of the lights shin-
ing easterly, and the siphoning of gas were done 
with his acquiescence, consent and approval. 
Maybee vs. Maybee, (1932) 79 Utah 585, 11 
P.2d 973, is a case in point. This case arose before 
the passing of the Utah guest law. The defendant 
driver, Mrs. Maybee, the mother of the plaintiff, 
was very nearsighted and wore eyeglasses. The 
daughter, the plaintiff, knew her mother required 
eyeglasses for driving. The daughter knew before 
the accident occurred that her mother was driving 
without using her eyeglasses and knew that her 
mother relied on eyeglasses to see. This court in af-
firming a directed verdict in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff in that case said: 
" * * * At the time of the accident plaintiff 
was eighteen years of age having become of 
that age April 23rd previously. Plaintiff testi-
fied that she had driven a car since she was 
sixteen, was familiar with the operation of 
the Dodge coupe and has alternated with the 
mother in driving the car on their trip East 
and the return. There is no evidence that 
plaintiff protested against her mother's driv-
ing without glasses or that she offered to do 
the driving after the glasses were broken. It 
is not disputed that every fact, circumstance, 
and condition relied on by the plaintiff as con-
stituting negligence on the part of the de-
f endant was fully known to an appreciated by 
plaintiff, a n d that, notwithstanding h e r 
knowledge of the defect in the eyesight of her 
mother and the fact that she was driving 
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without the aid of glasses, the plaintiff paid 
no attention to the conditions in the road, but 
was content to sit by and read a book while 
her driving at a of forty 
to forty-five miles an hour. If it was negli-
gence for the def end.ant to drive at this speed 
with her vision impaired as it was, and withr 
out the aid of g"lasses, it would follow that, 
where all these facts are fully known to and 
appreciated by the pl.aintiff, and notwithr 
standing such facts and such knowledge she 
was willing to be driven in the car, she not 
only assumed the risk or hazard to her ou.m 
safety, which resulted from such driving, but 
by her acquiescence, was guilty of indepenr 
dent negligence which contributed to the ac-
cident. The plaintiff identified herself with 
whatever negligence there was on the part 
of the mother because of her knowledge of 
all such facts and her approval, consent, and 
acquiescence in the driving of the car by her 
mother." (Emphasis added). 
Esernia vs. Overland Moving Co., (1949) 115 
Utah 519, 206 P.2d 621, is another case involving 
acquiescence of conduct. In this case, the plaintiff 
hitched a ride with defendant's driver near the out-
skirts of Elko, Nevada, to go to Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the time the plaintiff entered the truck he was 
told by the defendant driver that he was tired, 
weary and sleepy and the driver said he had driven 
straight through from San Francisco, California. 
Shortly thereafter, the driver of the defendant's ve-
hicle went off the pavement and onto the shoulder 
of the road, having dozed at the wheel. After this 
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incident the driver and the plaintiff continued on, 
the driver merely requesting the plaintiff and 
another Marine, also picked up, to talk to him so he 
would remain awake. Again the driver dozed and 
went off the road and this time the van was upset 
and the plaintiff was injured. In this case there was 
no dispute that the driver dozed and that the plain-
tiff knew he was weary and tired. It was undisputed 
that the plaintiff had an opportunity to leave the 
truck but still he elected to remain. 
In the above case the Supreme Court affirmed 
a judgment for the defendant, saying: 
"The evidence was uncontroverted that 
appellant knew that the driver was sleepy at 
the time he accepted the ride and also when 
the truck ran off the road the first time. 
Thereafter he had an opportunity to leave the 
truck when it stopped at Wendover or Delle, 
or he could have left the truck at any other of 
the towns between Elko and the point of the 
accident, of the existence of which this court 
can take judicial notice, but he did not leave. 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, 
Sec. 466, states that a plaintiff's contributory 
negligence may be ' (a) an intentional and un-
reasonable exposure of himself to danger 
created by the defendant's negligence of 
which danger the plaintiff knows or has rea-
son to know * * * ' and that ' * * * ( c) 
* * * a form of the type of contribu-
tory negligence with in . (a) con-
sists of the plaintiff's entrusting his 
to a third person whom he knows to be in-
competent, customarily negligent or ill-equip-
ped * * * '" 
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In Landru vs. Stensrud, ( 1945) 219 Minn. 227, 
17 N.W. 2d 322, an action was brought by an auto-
mobile guest for personal injuries suffered when the 
automobile which had been driven by the defendant 
on the ice of the lake in a fishing excursion broke 
through the ice. In this case the court affirmed a 
judgment for the defendants saying that the risk 
of injury from the known general hazards of the 
undertaking such as driving on ice constituted con-
tributory negligence in the assumption of this risk 
or was not evidence of driver's negligence in respect 
to the condition of the ice and, therefore, was insuf-
ficient to go to the jury. 
In Burns vs. F'isher (1957) 132 Mont. 26, 313 
P.2d 1044, plaintiff-decedent remained in a truck 
stalled on a highway and failed to put out flares in 
violation of statute. In this case the court ruled 
plaintiff could not recover because the decedent was 
contributorily negligent. 
Section 466 Restatement of the Law Second, 
Torts 2d, provides: 
"§ 466. Types of Contributory Negligence 
The plaintiff's contributory negligence may 
be either 
(a) an intentional and unreasonable ex-
posure of himself to danger created by the de-
fendant's negligence, of which danger the 
plaintiff knows or has reason to know, or 
( b) conduct which, in respects other 
than those stated in Clause (a), falls short 
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of the standard to which the reasonable man 
should conform in order to protect himself 
from harm." 
The law required Blaine Sweat to act as area-
sonably prudent person under the circumstances. 
If it was negligence for Rickie Allison to do 
what he did, Blaine Orvel Sweat was equally guilty 
of contributory negligence proximately causing his 
injuries and death. 
Appellant's statement that Blaine Sweat never 
agreed at any time to the conduct of Fuhriman or 
Allison is without support. As a matter of fact, the 
record shows he volunteered to siphon the gas and 
acquiesced Allison's conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment in favor of James H. 
Maddox should be affirmed because: 
1. Appellants have not specified any error in 
granting judgment in favor of him. 
2. There is no evidence that James H. Maddox 
was negligent in loaning the jeep to Rickie Allison. 
The summary judgment in favor of James H. 
Maddox and Dan Allison should be affirmed be-
cause if it was negligent for Rickie Allison to do 
what he did, it was, under the same circumustances, 
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contributory negligence for Blaine Orvel Sweat to ' 
act as he did at the time and place of the accident. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond M. Berry 
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